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Introduction
During the Cold War the term “missile gap” was created to indicate 
the United States’ delay in the missiles race. Today a  similar situation 
took place in cyberspace, where more and more policymakers and pun-
dits pointed out the growing cyber capabilities of China as a threat to the 
American national security and the destabilizing factor in region. Indeed, 
the Chinese have started to develop its tools and methods to paralyze the 
ICT systems of a potential adversary to comply with the quotation from 
Mao Zedong “to achieve victory we must as far as possible make the ene-
my blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears.” Considering the uncertain 
political relations with the United States, China needs to possess the abil-
ity to deter this country from engaging in regional conflicts. However, the 
robust cyber capabilities have a significant role for long-term development 
strategy and economic prosperity. 
The main aim of this article is to evaluate the cyber warfare capabili-
ties of China and simultaneously answer the question about the potential 
consequences for Cross Strait Relations and the bilateral relations with 
the United States. In order to do this the strategic aims of the Chinese ac-
tivity in cyberspace will be examined as well as the character of operations 
carried out by Chinese hackers. What is more, an analysis of the strong 
and weak points of Chinese capabilities in this matter will be depicted. 
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In addition, the potential scenarios of practical usage of cyber warfare will 
be presented with particular focus on the deterrence of the reaction of the 
United States in case of war over Taiwan. The article is divided into two 
parts: one descriptive, which presents the assets of China in conducting 
cyber warfare operations and the second one, where the evaluation of it 
and the consequences for regional security system will be presented.
In this article the cyber warfare capabilities are broadly defined as not 
only the ability to inflict physical damages but also as advanced methods 
of gathering information through cyber espionage or using them as a mul-
tiplier of force to blind enemy systems or as a part of sophisticated infor-
mation warfare. Evaluation of the cyber warfare capabilities constitutes 
a more challenging task than classical military capabilities. In the virtual 
world we cannot count the number of tanks and jets. In this paper in order 
to assess the Chinese cyber capabilities the various documents were com-
pared and analyzed, which describe and evaluate the degree of the threat. 
What is more, the most advanced cyber operations will be presented to 
create a comprehensive view on the cyber warfare capabilities of China.
Defining the Chinese Strategy 
China’s military history has been defined by asymmetric warfare. Cy-
ber warfare is just a  new tactic (Harris 2008). The Chinese strategy of 
operating in cyberspace comes from the American experience and obser-
vations of the first Gulf War and the Balkan intervention. Especially, the 
operational concept called cooperative target engagement based on sharing 
data on potential targets simultaneously by the combat platforms on the 
sea, air and land worried Chinese strategists (Wortzel 2014, p. 3). To join 
the effort of all military assets effectively the United States needs the global 
information and command-control systems based on satellites (Weiguan, 
Xijan, Ji & Jijin 2005, p. 82). In the book entitled Unrestricted Warfare 
two People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force officers concluded that the 
American military is so highly reliant on information that the side that will 
dominate the aspect of conflict in cyberspace will gain a strategic advan-
tage. The PLA officers suggested that China needed to look for a method 
to exploit this weakness (Qiao & Xiangsui 2009). The first strategies and 
doctrines on information warfare (IW), with particular reference to cyber-
space were drafted in the midst of 1990s. According to Dr. Shen Weiguan, 
who is commonly recognized as a father of IW, the main target of IW is 
“the enemy cognitive and trust systems and the goal is to exert control over 
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his actions” (Striennon 2010, p. 16). In 2004 a more detailed vision was 
described by General Xu Xiaoyan, the former head of the Communications 
Department of Chinese General Staff, who pointed out that China needs 
a “Network confrontation technology – intercepting, utilizing, corrupting 
and damaging the enemy’s information and using false information, vi-
ruses and other means to sabotage normal information systems functions 
through computer networks” (Thoma 2007, p. 333).
In practice it means that the Chinese focus on defending PLA networks 
and simultaneously attack in order to penetrate, exploit and perhaps even 
damage or sabotage through electronic means crucial entities such as in-
tegrated battlefield command-and-control systems and warfare networks, 
financial hubs to paralyze decision-making centers, slow down operations 
and ultimately decrease the morale of potential adversaries (Inkster 2012, 
p. 199). It links with altering the results of reconnaissance, thermal im-
aging, ballistic missile warning and radar sensing (Wortzel 2014, p. 21). 
They believed that all of these operations can be conducted whilst staying 
anonymous or with a low-risk of counterattack (Singer & Friedman 2014, 
p. 142). Chinese strategists also think that advanced cyber warfare capa-
bilities could be used as deterrent. They assumed that any foreign powers, 
which could threaten China, will be highly dependent on computer sys-
tems. The infiltration and disruption of these computers systems is per-
ceived as a defensive measure (Singer & Friedman 2014, p. 143).
The PLA treats cyberspace differently than, for example, Israel does 
and perceives it as an additional domain, which can influence shaping the 
battle space but rather not as a replacement for conventional war.1 From 
the Chinese point of view, cyber warfare takes place in the electromagnet-
ic spectrum and due to this fact it overlaps with traditional electronic war-
fare (Sheldon 2011, pp. 36–51). The Chinese perceived cyber capabilities 
as “bloodless” (Xinhua Publishing House 2000, pp. 213–215).
There is also another important aim of China in cyberspace – gath-
ering strategic data to speed up the modernization process. The roots of 
these behaviors date back to the 1980s and the 863 program that involved 
a large-scale operation of gathering information about Western technol-
ogies. Initially this process was chaotic, however, later it started to be 
supervised by the military and industry complex and has become more 
effective. The widespread use of the Internet has given a new tool for con-
ducting this process and has allowed to decrease using human intelligence 
1 Israel strategists believe that cyber warfare can constitute an equivalent of classical 
military activity (Kozłowski 2014e).
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(HUMINT) operations, which were highly risky and could finish with an 
embarrassing diplomatic scandal in the case of catching spies (U.S.-China 
Economic And Security Review Commission 2009).
The significance of Chinese cyberspace was underscored in the latest 
National Defense Doctrine by statements about the necessity of possess-
ing the developed abilities to conduct information operations, building an 
integrated system of electronic warfare and the satellites reconnaissance. 
It should consist of cosmic stations, computers and integrated computer 
networks, information networks and a broad range of different software 
both with a defensive and offensive character in order to protect the na-
tional interests in the military, economic and geopolitical dimensions far 
away from Chinese borders (Buczyński 2014, p. 256).
Chinese Cyber Warfare Capabilities Assets 
Chinese units responsible for conducting different cyber warfare activ-
ities are divided into two groups: professional hackers within the PLA and 
the “patriotic hackers” who, from time to time, work for the government 
and support different operations in cyberspace. The Chinese structure of 
supervision over cyber operations is not so clearly presented as in the case 
of the United States. Nonetheless, most experts believed that the majority 
of cyber operations were conducted under the auspices of the PLA General 
Staff Department’s Third Department. This structure seems similar to the 
American National Security Agency (NSA) and concentrates its efforts on 
signals intelligence, code breaking and communications security of the PLA. 
130,000 people worked there (Singer & Friedman 2014, p. 141). The most 
important element of this department is the Beijing North Computer Center 
(PLA 61539 Unit). It supervised ten subdivisions, which work on “the design 
and development of computer network defense, attack and exploitation sys-
tems” (Singer & Friedman 2014, p. 141). China also focuses a lot on training 
and therefore there are twelve special training facilities located all around 
the country. A special role is played by a unit in Zhurihe that simulates the 
behavior of the United States and its allies in cyberspace and is used to train 
Chinese units and improve their abilities (Singer & Friedman 2014, p. 141).
The widely recognized cyber unit of China is the Second Bureau of the 
Third Amy, Unit 61398.2 This unit consisted of the most experienced and 
2 This entity has become popular and widely recognized after the American IT security 
company Mediant published in 2011 a report indicating the authorship of the majority 
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skillful IT specialists, electronic engineers, mathematicians and linguists 
– mostly English speaking – with the main headquarters in Shanghai. Unit 
61398 plays a role not only as the typical conventional unit but rather it 
constitutes an operational center, which realized the decision undertaken 
in Beijing about activity in cyberspace (Buczyński 2014, p. 258). What is 
more, it acts as the research center responsible for acquiring and devel-
oping new IT technologies and implementation to their own computer 
networks in order to secure them and conduct effective invigilation of 
potential adversaries (Buczyński 2014, p. 258). The main aim of this unit 
is to steal the most vulnerable information about developmental trends, 
economy, technology and research especially in the area of military in-
dustry or data about the strategies and doctrines of potential adversaries. 
These activities are aimed at gaining advantage over other countries in the 
region and in the world, developing the operational advantage in case of 
a potential armed conflict (Buczyński 2014, p. 258).
An important role is also played by the Fourth Department (Electronic 
Warfare and Electronic Countermeasure Department) of the General Staff 
of the PLA (4/PLA), which conducts offensive electronic warfare, electron-
ic countermeasures (jamming and counter-jamming). The last initiative 
of this unit covers the establishment of the new Information Safeguards 
Base in order to address cyber threats and strengthen the information 
security and infrastructure (Pu 2010). The Third and Fourth Department 
closely cooperate with each other. The former one analyzes and exploits 
the cyber information gathered by the latter one (Wortzel 2014, p. 23).
Moreover, the Third Department assigned to every military region 
headquarters department at least one technical reconnaissance bureau 
in order to monitor foreign communications and cyber activity (Melvin 
2005, p. 1–2). Under the auspices of the Third Department also function 
three research institutes, four operational centers and twelve operational 
bureaus, which monitor phone, radio, satellite and computer communi-
cations (Stokes, Lin & Hsiao 2011).
A significant community of so-called patriotic hackers exists in Chi-
na, who conduct simple operations in cyberspace like DDoS attacks, web 
defacement and email bombing. To these groups belong the members of 
university IT departments, employees in the IT departments of state-
owned enterprises, online gamers and even criminals. Sometimes they 
of sophisticated cyber attacks against the United States to PLA 61398 (Mandiant_
APT1_Report 2012).
Andrzej Kozłowski166
act alone without orders from authorities but it is important to stress that 
their activity is all the time monitored by the Chinese government. There 
are also certain situations, when they follow the orders of official authori-
ties attacking a particular target (Inkster 2012, p. 202). 
Operations of Chinese Hackers 
The first kind of operation conducted by Chinese hackers reflects the 
information warfare in the virtual domain. The tremendous pace of In-
ternet development gave a variety of novel options to achieve information 
domination. The first primitive actions taken by the Chinese hackers can 
be traced back to the turn of 1999 and 2000, to the next scene of Chi-
nese-Taiwanese conflict, when then President of Taiwan Lee Teng-Hui an-
nounced that Taiwan is an independent country and does not constitute 
a part of China. This declaration led to simple hacker web defacement 
attacks, where the governmental website of Taiwan was covered with the 
inscriptions that only one China exists and one China is needed and also 
they put a red flag (Gawrycki 2003, pp. 166–167).
The second important event was the confrontation of Chinese and 
American hackers who clashed with each other over the air collision be-
tween the Chinese jet and American reconnaissance plane, which was 
forced to land in China. Americans started web defacement attacks post-
ing on Chinese administrative websites insulting pictures, passwords 
and carried out attacks against the China Nuclear Information Center 
and China Telekom. In response Chinese hackers created the Killus.com 
website to facilitate conducting operations in the virtual world against 
websites of American governmental institutions (Węderska 2014, p. 77). 
These kinds of information and parts of information warfare always ap-
peared to reflect tensions in bilateral relations. It happened many times in 
the case of the United States or the regional rival. 
In 2012 new tensions aroused between China and Philippines regard-
ing the Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands and quickly this situation 
transformed into conflict in cyberspace, where the Philippines official ad-
ministration websites and other institutions were defaced (Passeri 2012). 
A similar situation happened in disputes with Japan over an island (The 
Globe and Mail), South Korea (Al Jazeera 2013) and Vietnam (TuoiTre 
News). The Chinese also attack newspapers, which published unfavora-
ble articles about the domestic situation or the leaders of China (Perlroth 
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2013). The majority of these simple and unsophisticated attacks are con-
ducted by volunteer hackers, who sometimes do not possess adequate skills 
and can be traced by foreign countries. However, the lack of international 
law regulating such cases caused that cyberspace allows China to demon-
strate their dissatisfaction about certain behavior of different countries. 
The second kind of operation can be described as a Chinese specialty. It is 
a  cyber espionage operation addressed against other countries, as well 
as against private enterprises. The first well-known operation was Titan 
Rain. This operation, which started in 2003 and ended in 2005 was aimed 
at stealing secrets from United States research labs, military branches and 
agencies and defense contractors, with the most valuable data systemati-
cally stolen. Data such as the plans of American defense systems, the F-35 
fighter jet or data about the American probe sent to Mars (Stiennon 2010, 
pp. 1–11). Titan Rain was not the only large scale cyber espionage opera-
tion against the United States. It was followed by the Shady Rat operation, 
which started in 2006 and lasted till 2011. The investigators of this case 
informed that more than 72 institutions not only in the United States but 
in the whole world suffered the breach. Among them were American mil-
itary enterprises, international corporations, the networks of the United 
Nations organizations and even the International Olympic Committee 
(McAfee 2014). In 2011 a Chinese hacker penetrated the resources of RSA 
Security, a  company responsible for producing the sophisticated coding 
mechanism for the government. These actions can allow for easier pene-
tration of the Department of Defense (DoD) and other governmental in-
stitutions (Blogs.RSA). In 2013 the most serious leak of military data was 
revealed and the Chinese hackers stood behind it (Kozłowski 2014a). The 
Chinese hackers attacked not only the United States. They also breached 
the cyber defense of Israel and stole secrets about the latest antimissile 
system called “Iron Dome” (Kozłowski 2014b). In addition, the European 
Union members and institutions were also among the victims of Chinese 
cyber espionage (Gayathri 2013). The hackers are not limited to actions 
against the governmental institutions or military branch representatives 
but also hacked Google accounts in order to trace the data of human rights 
activists (Kozłowski 2014c, p. 230). 
The Chinese are highly qualified experts in cyber espionage, achieving 
a lot of success. They aimed at the military technologies being aware that 
their own military forces have still lagged behind the West and through 
cyber espionage they wanted to do a low-cost shortcut. According to differ-
ent sources the advanced espionage operations in the virtual world helped 
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make up for 15 or 20 years with the Western countries (Zakaria 2014). 
Not only are the Chinese interested in solely military technology but also 
in the business plans of different companies or negotiation stances of 
Western countries to compete with them effectively. It seems that cyber 
espionage bore the most valuable fruits for the government in China.
The third option covers the cyber operations, which are able to inflict 
physical damages. Despite the fact that there were no official statements 
about such an operation, the existing proofs and journalist investigations 
claimed that it could be different. The suspicions exist that Chinese hack-
ers stood behind several major blackouts in the United States. In 2003 
one of the most serious blackouts in the history of the United States took 
place. 50 million people in a 9,300 square-mile area lost power and sev-
eral people died. Commonly, it is assumed that it was caused by the mal-
function of certain elements of electric networks. However, according to 
the information provided by Tim Bennett, the former president of the 
Cyber Security Industry Alliance, this accident was caused by sophisti-
cated malware probably developed by Chinese hackers linked to the PLA. 
Bennet believes that the Florida blackout, which affected 3 million people, 
was also produced by the activities of hostile powers, probably coming 
from China. What is more, Joel Brenner, the government’s senior coun-
terintelligence official, neither confirms nor denies these allegations but 
he states that it seems plausible for him. This surprising news was denied 
by officials, however, it is extremely difficult to state unequivocally, which 
version is right due to the fact that majority of electric lines belong to 
private sector companies that are not eager to share information about 
these kinds of accidents (Harris 2008). If this information is really true it 
means that China possesses very advanced cyber warfare capabilities and 
can inflict serious damage on United States infrastructure, which may 
even end with a death toll.
The United States security companies and major political and mili-
tary figures warned public opinion about the threat flowing from Chinese 
cyber warriors. The majority of the reports created by these enterprises 
and the hearings in Congress of main officials indicated that Chinese 
cyber warfare capabilities are really massive and sophisticated. General 
James Cartwright, the former head of US Strategic Command, told the 
US – China Economic and Security Review Commission that the par-
ticular threat stemmed from the Chinese ability to manufacture massive 
amounts of automatically generated message traffic. It has the potential 
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to cause cataclysmic damages, including paralyzing critical infrastructure 
or military command (Marquand & Arnoldy 2007). He compared it to the 
usage of mass destruction (Harris 2008).  His statements were repeated by 
former NSA Director, Admiral Mike McConnel, who compared the cur-
rent situation to the Cold War, when the United States had to protect it-
self against nuclear attack. Now they must do the same with cyber attacks 
against elements of critical infrastructure, which is highly dependent on 
IT systems (McConnel 2010).
Nevertheless, the majority of these statements are exaggerated, most-
ly because the security companies want more contracts from the scared 
administration units or individuals, but it is an indisputable fact that Chi-
nese cyber warriors are among the top countries.   
Considering the sophistication of technology, China is among the top 
countries and is owns one of the fastest computers on the whole plan-
et, which allows it to break the most complicated codes and passwords 
(Vance 2010).
The next powerful cyber weapon lies in the number of Chinese peo-
ple (around 1.4 billion) (CIA Factbook) and therefore, simultaneously the 
biggest number of Internet users. In the near future Chinese hackers will 
flood other countries not with the latest technology but by the number 
of hackers and thus the uncountable amount of operations in the virtual 
domain (Segal 2012, p. 20). Chinese hackers have proved their ability to 
conduct information warfare in cyberspace at the high level (Car 2012, 
pp. 90–91). Its strength came from the big number of linguists skilled in 
different languages and in specialized areas, such as financial abilities, 
energy or military activity.
Taking into account the sophisticated and successful methods of com-
puter network exploitation used by the Chinese in their cyber espionage 
activities, the same method can be used to attack systems and destroy 
data. It depends only on the computer user’s intent. The skills needed to 
penetrate networks during peacetime to collect intelligence are the same 
that are used to penetrate networks during wartime. Chinese hackers con-
duct many successful cyber espionage operations against private compa-
nies and United States government assets (The US-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission 2009, p. 9).
The Chinese cyber warfare capabilities have also limits and own 
flaws, which can be easily exploited by their opponents. The Computer 
Network Defense is the weakest point of Chinese warfare capabilities. 
Andrzej Kozłowski170
China, according to raw data statistics is the main victim of cyber attacks. 
The Chinese Ministry of Public Security informed that the number of 
hostile incidents against the computers in China rose up by more than 
80% annually and 10 to 19 million computers belong to botnet networks. 
The reason behind this situation lies in the widespread use of illegal soft-
ware that often comes from unreliable sources. Some statistics point out 
that even 95% of computer software can be pirated, which means that 
they could not be actualized as the legal license holders do. Therefore Chi-
na’s disregard to intellectual property is a dual-edge sword, bringing both 
positive and negative effects (Inkster 2012, p. 199). 
The second main problem is a centralized structure of Internet gov-
erning, which means that it is much easier to paralyze the Chinese In-
ternet through sophisticated attacks than to do the same thing with the 
United States networks operated by different Internet providers. What is 
more, the Chinese use American software and hardware, which possess 
a built in domestic weakness that allows it to conduct attacks (Dziwisz 
2013, p. 154).
Implications for Cross-Strait Relations 
The development of Chinese cyber warfare capabilities may have 
a significant impact on the future of Taiwan. It adds one additional di-
mension to a potential conflict field between the states and maybe even 
most political tensions will be reflected in cyberspace because the opera-
tions in the virtual domain are bloodless. The Chinese cyber capabilities 
buildup is aimed mainly at deterring and delaying the United States re-
sponse to an outbreak of conflict over Taiwan.
According to the potential scenarios of war with Taiwan, the Com-
puter Operation Network (CNO) will be carried out in the initial phase 
of conflict to preemptively strike against information systems and the 
C4ISR systems of Taiwan and, what is even more important, against the 
United States (The US-China Economic and Security Review Commis-
sion 2009). In reference to Taiwan the PLA strategist believes that the 
CNO will play a crucial role as the psychological factor that contributes 
to decreasing the will of Taiwanese people through disrupting and para-
lyzing the infrastructure and economic vitality. This scenario seems plau-
sible, especially when considering the weakness and fragility of the power 
grid network characterized by single-point failure nodes and the lack of 
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subgrids. These kinds of structures make any attack much easier (Mul-
venon 2004, pp. 265–258). In a  potential war with the United States, 
China probably will use CNO capabilities to paralyze selected nodes on 
the military’s Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPR-
NET), unclassified DoD and logistics networks of civilian contractors in 
the continental United States and American allies in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion. However, not all of the networks will be attacked but only crucial 
nodes identified by the PLA planners as those points, which most deeply 
affect the decision-making process. PLA assessment of US campaigns in 
Iraq, the Balkans and Afghanistan identified logistics and the force deploy-
ment times as the most vulnerable points, the interruption of which will 
lead to supply delays or shortages. The main reason behind this situation 
lies in the responsibility of private companies for these kinds of activities 
on the battlefield, which are much more vulnerable to the attacks due to 
either a lack of adequate funds to secure networks or the reluctance to do 
it. PLA CNO activities are aimed to maximally delay US deployment and 
decrease the effectiveness of American military assets already deployed 
in the war theatre to allow PLA forces to achieve operational objectives 
such as landing troops on Taiwan in a cross-strait scenario before the US 
can effectively intervene (The US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission 2009, pp. 12–16). The most optimistic scenario assumes 
that a cyber attack allows achieving operational success without requir-
ing direct combat with superior US forces (The US-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission 2009, p. 24). The defeat of the Taiwanese 
forces and the capitulation of the government on the island would present 
the United States a fait accompli situation upon the arrival of the Ameri-
can main armed forces.
Conclusion 
China’s long-standing binding to asymmetric warfare justifies why 
cyber warfare is so popular among policymakers in this country. Being 
under the impression of overwhelming American victory over Iraq in the 
Gulf War and appreciating the role of computer systems in the victory, 
China, since the middle of the 1990s, has focused on developing cyber 
capabilities, perceiving them as an important strategic asset in a poten-
tial confrontation with the regional actors, particularly Taiwan but most-
ly against the United States, seeing in the computer network attack an 
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attractive, asymmetric weapon against a more technologically advanced 
country. Taking into account many clashes in the past, including the hu-
miliation of China in the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, and still a number of 
unraveled, potentially troublesome issues, China wants to assure that it 
possesses a weapon that can inflict damage on the United States and bal-
ance the American advantage in conventional weaponry. However, China 
not only sees operations in cyberspace as a useful tool to deter Americans, 
but it also as important for the significant cyber espionage campaigns in 
order to speed up the buildup of conventional armed forces and increase 
the competitiveness of Chinese entrepreneurship in the world.
The Chinese government builds robust structure, drafts strategists 
and doctrines of using cyber warfare capabilities and tests it in practice. 
Three kinds of operations are included in Chinese operations in cyber-
space, covering: cyber espionage, information warfare and more sophisti-
cated actions aimed at critical infrastructure. The cyber ability of China 
is mostly created to dominate the region but first and foremost to deter 
and slow the United States’ reaction to any outbreak of regional conflict, 
particularly in the case of Taiwan. Despite the fact that China belongs to 
the absolute top of countries with the most advanced cyber capabilities, 
the “Cyber Weapons Gap” does not exist as the United States dominates 
cyberspace and its hegemony there is even more significant than in the 
real world.
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